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Introduction
Migration is generally triggered by armed conflicts and human rights violations, climate change, economic pressure and global opportunities, and the existence of kinship created by earlier migration. Many states have enacted restrictive laws on immigration and strengthened the enforcement of these laws, particularly to minimise their responsibilities under international law towards migrants and their families.
Principles of international law regarding the family emerged relatively recently.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, issues concerning families and family law were dealt with by international law 'only insofar as it established the choice-of-law principles for cases in national courts involving immigrant families or families of mixed nationality.' 2 Back then, disputes relating to the personal status of individuals were governed by the law of the individual's domicile, under 'the domicile-based principle '. 3 The rise in human rights treaties in the second half of the twentieth century led to the recognition of substantive principles relating to states' treatment of families and the protection of children. 4 It is now generally recognised that the family 'is entitled to respect, protection, assistance, and support '. 5 This chapter examines the centrality of the family, both nuclear and extended, in the international legal framework in a migration context. It focuses particularly on family unity and family reunification of persons in need of protection, that is, on already established families of refugees and asylum seekers and the resulting legal issues arising from the refusal to enter or the proposed deportation of a family member. This chapter does not therefore discuss families in formation or immigration for the purpose of marriage.
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It is divided into five sections. Section two examines the international legal framework that establishes the protection of the family as a human right. It argues that a subjective right to family clearly exists under international human rights law but that the status of a 'right' to family unity/reunification is less clear in international law for two main reasons: first, the lack of a universal definition of 'family' underlying the concept of family reunification, and two, the protection of family reunification requires positive steps on the part of states. Sections three and four explore the contributions of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union, respectively, to the enjoyment of a right to family reunification, and discuss the relationship between the two courts in this context. In a concluding section five, this chapter draws on selective 3 Ibid, p.216.
These instruments protect both already existing families as well as future families through the right to marriage and to form a family. 11 Yet, none of these provisions constitute a right to family reunification as such. 12 Rather, in order to give effect to 'the fundamental principle of preserving family unity', 13 international human rights law seeks to facilitate family reunification and family reunion, including the tracing of dispersed family members. 14 The same applies under international humanitarian law and international refugee law.
International Humanitarian Law
Respect for family life (namely, 'family honour' and 'family rights') is generally protected under customary international humanitarian law and treaties of international humanitarian law. 15 In addition, international humanitarian law requires states to facilitate the reunion of families dispersed as a result of armed conflicts. and refugees as a tool for strengthening the policy of integration into the host society and is in the interests of social cohesion (para.6). It recommends therefore the right to family reunion to be applicable as soon as possible to all lawfully residing immigrants and refugees. 13 Quoted from the Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and IDPs in the Republic of Georgia, 1994 . Kate Jastram and Kathleen Newland posit that 'The right to family unity is inherent in the right to family life ', in Feller et al. Refugee Protection in International Law, CUP, 2003, at p.556. 14 CRC, article 10 and article 22(1) and 22 (2) 
International Refugee Law
In a migration context, particularly with regard to refugees and asylum seekers, the right to family or family life often clashes with states' power to expel or deny entry to members of their family, since refugees are not able to return to their country of origin in order to enjoy family life there. States' power to expel a member of an existing family to his/her country of origin raise issues of 'family unity'; states' power to deny entry to a family member in order to reunite with another family member(s) raises issues of family reunification or reunion. As indicated above, 'family unity' and 'family reunification' of refugees and asylum seekers, whether or not they are children, are protected under both international human rights law and international humanitarian law. However, Stevens insightfully observes that 'Despite the importance ascribed to the family … once the family assumes the added descriptor of 'migrant' or 'asylum-seeking', there is an evident shift in approach by most states'.
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The right to family life is absent from the text of the 1951 Refugee Convention. UNHCR points to two different kinds of society: the first, to be found in many countries of origin, applies a 'customarily broad definition of the family'; the second, to be found mainly in countries of asylum, defines a 'narrower "nuclear family".' Actually, the Strasbourg Court is more willing to protect family rights in relations to removal than in relation to refusal of entry. 66 The Court has indeed introduced a distinction between cases of removal of an alien from the territory of a contracting party, resulting in the break up of family unity, and cases of (refusal of) entry of aliens into the territory of a contracting party for the purpose of family reunification. 
The European Union and its court

The legislative framework and a right to family reunification in EU law
In the early days of the then European Economic Community (EEC), an effective and enforceable right to family reunification for nationals of the member states was essential in ensuring freedom of movement of workers within the EEC; this right was However, a recent study highlights the limited application of Charter rights to individuals due to not enough attention being paid to access of justice, the enforcement of Charter rights and possible remedies for individuals whose fundamental rights have been breached. 81 The last ten years also saw the adoption of common minimum standards relating to 'family' and 'family reunification' being adopted in the context of migration. There is also a certain amount of flexibility in the Directive particularly concerning evidence of an existing relationship for refugees where documentary evidence may be lacking. In such cases, any other evidence of that relationship may be taken into account. 93 Further specific provisions apply to refugees and their right to family reunification. In particular, unaccompanied minors who are refugees shall be authorised to be reunited with his/her parent without conditions of dependency being required. 94 In cases where there are no parents or these cannot be traced, unaccompanied refugee children may only be allowed to be joined by their legal guardian or other relatives of the family. 95 The scope of this Directive does not however cover beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.
90 Article 4(6).
91 Article 4(2).
92 Article 4(3). 93 Article 11. 94 Article 10(3)(a). In sum, EU legislation explicitly recognises a right to family reunification but the practical application of this right is considerably limited by a narrow definition of 'family members', i.e., the nuclear family of a sponsor or a refugee (excluding beneficiaries of subsidiary protection).
The ECJ/CJEU and its relationship with the European Court of Human Right: synergy or fragmentation?
In the CJEU was faced with whether to apply the Zambrano's logic to a case involving a third country national spouse but no children. Shirley McCarthy, a dual UK and Irish national who was born in the UK and had always been resident there, had sought to rely on her Irish nationality and EU law to obtain a residence card for herself and her Jamaican husband. The CJEU found that she could not benefit from such EU right since she had never exercised her right to freedom of movement and had always resided in a member state of which she was a national. In reaching its decision, the CJEU considered In sum, this judgment provides an illustration of the Zambrano's decision in the case of an adult seeking to assert free movement rights to help her third country national husband. Since the national decision in this case would not have forced her to leave the territory of the EU, the CJEU found the denial of the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states not to have the effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of her status as a Union citizen. This interpretation is reminiscent of the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights in its recent case law (see discussion above on Aristimuno Mendizabal, Rodriges Da Silva, and Malsov), but there are at least two important differences; first, the Strasbourg Court does not require a child to be involved, second, when a child is involved, the Strasbourg Court acknowledges in much clearer terms the importance of the best interests and welfare of a child.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the existence of a right to family (or family life) and states' duty to facilitate the reunification of families in international law. In Europe, both regional courts (the Strasbourg Court and the Luxembourg Court) have taken the view that depriving people of their right to family reunification is equal to interference with family life. Of particular interest is the fact that both courts have been focusing on the enjoyment of the right to family reunification rather than the existence of the right itself. Hence, in a number of recent cases, the two courts have sought to give content to a state's duty to respect family reunification through a right of residence and work permits; family life 'must not only be 'respected', it must also be 'protected'' within the meaning of 'a positive protective function'. 119 However, in practice, their approach differ quite considerably as the Luxembourg Court finds itself constrained to operate within a stricter (more narrow) legislative framework (based on considerations of free movement and European citizenship) than the Strasbourg Court, hence, the Luxembourg Court's approach to granting a right of residence to foreign nationals may be said to be more restrictive than that of the Strasbourg Court. Notwithstanding, this chapter shows that the two courts are working in synergy (at least for now) in the protection of the right to family reunification of migrants living in Europe in that both courts are essentially concerned with issues of integration in society and care in intimate relations.
Like in Europe, in the Americas and in Africa, the right to family reunification has been affirmed and given substance following judicial intervention. The Inter-American system, like the European system, protects the right to family life 120 and imposes upon states both positive and negative obligations to ensure that these rights are enforced, 
